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LABOR RELATIONS in the
Air Transport Industry 1947-1957
By E. B. McNATT, Professor of Economics, University of Illinois
Foreword
In 1948 Professor McNatt wrote and the Institute published LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY UNDER
THE AMENDED RAILWAY LABOR ACT. The bulletin was both a
timely and a pioneering attempt to examine and evaluate the status of
collective bargaining in a relatively new industry. The welcome which
was given the publication indicated that there would be a demand for a
successor to it with the passing of time. A decade has now passed, and
the progress in the air transport industry has brought not only amazing
technological developments but has also seen the air carriers succeed the
railroads and the ocean liners as the most important prime movers of
passenger traffic.
This development has been accompanied by corresponding change in
the realm of labor relations. In this monograph, Professor McNatt brings
together the developments, problems, and legal changes of the past decade
in the air transport labor field. His long experience as a teacher, author,
and practitioner in the labor field makes him fully qualified to produce
this bulletin for us.
The Institute of Aviation is pleased to present this monograph. In it,
as in all publications of the Institute, the author has had complete free-
dom to express his opinions, understanding that he assumes sole responsi-
bility therefor.
September 1958 LESLIE A. BRYAN, Director
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Introduction
Modern industrial relations in the American air transport industry are
only some twenty years old. In an earlier monograph we reviewed the
development of these relations from 1937 to 1947. * In the past decade
major changes in our economy have taken place, and naturally the air
transport industry has participated in these changes and has been affected
by them. It would seem appropriate and timely, therefore, to review the
impact of these changes upon industrial relations in this industry, to
examine the causal factors involved, and to appraise the results.
Specifically, this study will attempt to throw some light on the answers
to such questions as the following: (1) How has collective bargaining
functioned as a device for establishing labor standards in this industry?
(2) Do the present legal requirements provide a desirable framework for
the satisfactory functioning of collective bargaining and industrial rela-
tions in this industry? (3) Have industrial relations and industrial peace
been advancing or retrogressing during the past decade in this industry?
(4) How do the legal requirements for establishing labor standards and
maintaining industrial peace compare with the regulations and require-
ments for nonairline employers and employees (the Taft-Hartley law)?
(5) What are some of the major "problem areas" in industrial relations
which have developed in this industry in the past ten years, and how are
they being resolved?
1
E. B. McNatt, Labor Relations in the Air Transport Industry Under the
Amended Railway Labor Act, Aeronautics Bulletin No. 3, Institute of Aeronautics,
I niv. of 111., Urbana, 111., 1948. (Out of print.)
I. The Legal Framework
Public regulation of the industrial relations of commercial airlines in
this country dates from 1936. In that year the Railway Labor Act of
1926 2 was further amended by the addition of Title II, which extended
to the air transport industry practically the entire law of railway labor
relations. 3 Further strength was added to this provision by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, the basic air transport law today (1958), which
states that any air carrier wishing to secure and to retain a certificate of
convenience and necessity must comply with Title II of the Railway
Labor Act. 4
The general purpose of the Railway Labor Act, as amended (herein-
after referred to as the Railway Labor Act), is stated to be the avoidance
of any interruptions to interstate commerce, the protection of employee
and employer rights of self-organization and association, and the orderly
2 44 Stat. 577; amended in 1934, 48 Stat. 1185; and in 1936, 49 Stat. 1189.
3
Sec. 201 of Title II states: "All of the provisions of Title I of this Act are
extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce, and every carrier by air transporting mail for or under contract
with the U. S. Government, and every air pilot or other person who performs any
work as an employee or subordinate official of such carrier or carriers, subject to
its or their continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition
of his service." Sec. 202 continues: "The duties, requirements, penalties, benefits,
and privileges prescribed and established by the provisions of Title I of this Act
shall apply to said carriers by air and their employees in the same manner and to
the same extent as though such carriers and their employees were specifically
included within the definition of 'carrier' and 'employee,' respectively, in section
1 thereof."
4
Sec. 401(1).
settlement of all disputes arising out of the negotiation of new contracts
or the interpretation of existing contracts. 5 To this end a number of
general duties are prescribed. 6 For example, the duty of all carriers and
their employees "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions" is
affirmed. That collective bargaining and negotiation is to be the primary
and principal method of arriving at terms and conditions of employment
is further stressed by the provision that "all disputes between a carrier
and its employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all
expedition, in conference between representatives designated and author-
ized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the em-
ployees thereof interested in the dispute." 7
The right of employees and employers alike to designate individuals
or organizations as representatives, without interference, influence, or
coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the
other, is guaranteed by the Act and further strengthened by the provision
which states that "representatives of employees for the purpose of this
Act need not be persons in the employ of the carrier, and no carrier shall
. . . seek in any manner to prevent the designation by the employees as
their representatives of those who or which are not employees of the
carrier." 8 This latter provision was obviously aimed at the rather com-
mon practices of many railroad companies in the 1920's of refusing to
deal with "outside" labor organizations, of insisting upon dealing with
company or "inside" unions, and of influencing their employees to desig-
nate such inside organizations as the employee representatives.
The statutory recognition of the common law right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing is made real and meaningful by imposing upon employers the
positive duty "to treat with" the certified representatives of the employees,
and by prohibiting a series of activities by employers. 9 It is a misdemeanor,
punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, for any carrier "to interfere
in any way with the organization of its employees"; to use their funds
to maintain any organization of employees, or to pay representatives of
employees; to require any employee, as a condition of employment, to
sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join any labor
organization. 10 It is the duty of the United States District Attorney to
institute proper proceedings and to prosecute, upon application of the
duly designated representatives of the employees, all carriers who violate
5
Title I, Sec. 2.
Sec. 2.
7
Sec. 2, Par. 2.
* Sec. 2, Par. 3.
:
' Sec. 2, Par. 9.
10
Sec. 2, Par. 4, 5.
any of the above provisions, such prosecution to be without cost to the
employees. These provisions thus outlaw in the air transport industry
such former employer practices as interference with or domination of
employee organizations, the use of the anti-union or yellow-dog contract,
and refusal to bargain collectively with employee organizations, as well
as such former union practices as the closed shop.
Prior to 1951 the Railway Labor Act also barred not only the closed
shop, but all forms of union security including the check-off. In 1951 the
Act was amended to permit union negotiation of the union shop and the
check-off in the railroad and air transport industries. 11 The check-off is
permitted, however, only when it is individually authorized in writing
by the employee involved, and then such authorization is revocable by
the employee after the expiration of one year or upon the termination of
the collective agreement, whichever occurs first.
Two other important features of the present law deserve special men-
tion because of the additional obligations imposed upon carriers and
employees, and particularly the prohibitions imposed upon the carriers.
It is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for any
carrier to change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its
employees as a class, as incorporated in agreements, except in the manner
prescribed in the agreements or in the Act. 12 Carriers and employees
must each serve upon the other written notices of proposed changes in
existing agreements, or of a desire to make a new agreement. Such
notices must be acknowledged within ten days, and within thirty days
conferences must begin for the purpose of negotiating the proposed
changes or the new agreement. 13 While these obligatory conferences are
being held, or while a dispute is in the hands of the National Mediation
Board (NMB), no changes in the rates of pay, rules, or working condi-
tions by the carrier are permitted until the controversy has been finally
acted upon by the NMB in accordance with the Act. In addition, the
carriers must advise their employees by printed and posted notices that
all labor disputes will be handled in accordance with the requirements
of the Act. 14
The present Railway Labor Act thus not only assumes that agreements
resulting from collective bargaining will have been negotiated and will
be in effect for most of the employees in this industry, but also gives these
agreements legal recognition as binding contracts which cannot be broken
lightly by either side. Air transport agreements today, therefore, repre-
sent contracts, establishing property rights for individual employees, which
are enforceable through adjudication by adjustment boards.
Public Law 914, January 10, 1951.
Sec. 2, Par. 7.
Sec. 2, Par. 6.
Sec. 2, Par. 8.
The NMB, composed of three public members appointed by the Presi-
dent with the consent of the Senate, has two major functions under the
present law. The first function concerns its role in the settlement of
employee representation disputes. If a dispute arises among employees
on a given airline as to what organization they desire to represent them
in dealing with the management, it is the duty of the NMB, on request
of either party, "to investigate such dispute and to certify, in writing,
. . .
the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been
designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the
dispute, and certify the same to the carrier." In such an investigation,
the NMB is authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved,
"or to utilize any other appropriate method ... as shall insure the choice
of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or
coercion exercised by the carrier." The authority to designate who may
participate in an employee election, coupled with the majority rule
provision, 15 gives the NMB rather broad discretionary power in determin-
ing the class or craft for employee bargaining purposes. This provision,
however, apparently guarantees that craft unionism rather than industrial
unionism will be the primary structural form of employee organization on
the commercial airlines.
The second major function of the NMB concerns its role in mediation,
arbitration, and investigation of disputes involving changes in rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions. These disputes, of course, arise only
in connection with the negotiation of new contracts. In such disputes, the
NMB is authorized, at the request of either party or on its own initiative,
to "use its best efforts, by mediation, to bring them [employees and
management] to agreement." If its mediating efforts fail, the NMB must
endeavor to induce the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.
Compulsory arbitration of disputes, however, is not required by the pres-
ent law. Arbitration, being entirely voluntary, may be refused by either
party to a dispute, without violating in any way the provisions of the Act.
If arbitration is refused by either party and if the dispute threatens
"substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to
deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service,"
the NMB must notify the President and he may at his discretion appoint
an emergency board to investigate the facts as to the dispute and report
thereon within thirty days. During this period and for thirty days after
the emergency board has made its report to the President, "no change,
except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in
the conditions out of which the dispute arose." The maintenance of
18 Sec. 2, Par. 4: "The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have
the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the
purposes of this Act."
status quo while the emergency board is investigating and reporting the
facts places the final reliance upon the pressure of public opinion to
compel a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Compulsory negotiation and
compulsory investigation, but not compulsory arbitration, are thus re-
quired by the present law.
A final provision in the present law of labor relations of the airlines
deals with the establishment of adjustment boards to settle grievances and
disputes growing out of the interpretation or administration of existing
agreements between the carriers and their employees. 10 The provision
for adjustment boards to interpret and administer agreements of the air-
lines follows very closely the provision in Title I of the Railway Labor
Act establishing adjustment boards in the railway industry. Thus it is
made the duty of every air carrier and its employees, acting through their
representatives, to establish a local or regional adjustment board for the
settlement of grievances or disputes growing out of the interpretation of
their agreements. Such boards are to be established by agreement between
the carrier or carriers concerned and representatives of their employees.
The interpretation of agreements on the railroads, under the original
1926 Railway Labor Act, was left entirely to voluntarily established
regional adjustment boards. Between 1926 and 1934, these voluntary
regional adjustment boards on the railroads proved unsatisfactory. Being
bipartisan, they were frequently deadlocked; there was no provision for
a neutral referee to break such a deadlock and no provision for an appeal
to a national adjustment board for a final and binding award. The 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act largely corrected these defects as
far as the railroad industry was concerned.
To avoid the possibility of a similar experience with voluntary local or
regional adjustment boards of the airlines, the present law provides for
the establishment of a National Air Transport Adjustment Board. 17 This
board is to be established when, in the judgment of the NMB, it shall be
necessary "in order to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of
disputes . . . growing out of grievances or out of the interpretations or
application of agreements." 18 The NMB is empowered to direct that the
air carriers select two representatives and that the national labor organiza-
tions representing airline employees select two representatives; these four
representatives shall then constitute the National Air Transport Adjust-
ment Board. The powers and duties of this board are made synonymous
with those of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, including the use
of a neutral referee in case of a deadlock and the issuance of final and
binding awards. 19
16
Title II, Sec. 204 and 205.
17
Title II, Sec. 205.
18
Ibid.
19
Title I, Sec. 3.
Although in the present law no specific penalties are provided for
failure to obey the decisions of either the National Air Transport Adjust-
ment Board or the NMB, any carrier who disobeys awards of the Adjust-
ment Board or any arbitration board set up in accordance with this law
is made subject to civil suits in Federal District Courts. 20 This definitely
implies that all the duties and responsibilities established by the law could
be enforced by appropriate court writs; and in 1937 this implication was
upheld in a broad ruling by the United States Supreme Court. 21 In this
case, the court held that the legal obligation of a carrier to "treat with"
the certified representatives of its employees imposed a positive duty
on the carrier to negotiate with the representatives so certified. The court
said, "It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that this
requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that its
command, in a proper case, be enforced by the courts." And further,
"The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the em-
ployer and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps with-
out which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer
to meet and confer with the authorized representatives of its employees,
to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differ-
ences— in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor
disputes." In this case, the court affirmed the use of the injunction in
enforcing the obligation of a carrier to make no agreements with employee
groups who were not certified by the NMB and also upheld the power
of the NMB to hold elections in representation disputes and to certify
to the employer the majority choice as the sole employee representative.
In summary, then, the present law of labor relations of the airlines
appears to establish rather definite rights, duties, and responsibilities for
both employers and employees in the area of collective bargaining. The
closed shop, the yellow-dog contract, and company unions are all pro-
hibited. Employers must bargain collectively with independently chosen
employee representatives when and if these employees desire such repre-
sentation. Agreements, once negotiated, must not be broken by either
side. Disputes over the interpretation of agreements must be settled by
adjustment boards, and disputes over the negotiation of new agreements
must follow certain prescribed steps before a legal strike may be instituted.
Compulsory arbitration is not required by the present legislation. If
voluntary arbitration is accepted by the parties involved in a dispute, the
arbitration award is binding and final.
It may be worth while at this stage to point out certain significant
differences between the regulation of industrial relations of the railways
20
Title I, Sec. 3, Clause (p).
81 Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees
Dept. of the A.F. of L., 300 U. S. 515 (March 29, 1937).
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and airlines and the federal regulation of industrial relations for non-
railway and nonairline industries. Because of the essential nature of
transportation service in the functioning of our national economy, it is
not surprising that the railroad and air transport industries have always
been considered as more directly "affected with a public interest" than
other industries. Hence, it is futhermore not surprising that industrial
relations in the transportation industries should come early under public
review and scrutiny and that a national code of permissible employer-
employee conduct should be developed. Finally, it is not too surprising
that in the development of a national regulatory code of industrial
relations conduct, major emphasis should be placed upon avoidance of
interruption of this essential public service. The present national law
of labor relations in the railroad and air transport industries reflects the
attempts to implement this social objective.
Perhaps the best way to outline the more significant similarities and
differences between the Railway Labor Act and the amended National
Labor Relations Act (NRLA) is to group them under the following head-
ings: (1) the role or function of the NMB versus the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB)
; (2) the prohibited employer and employee
practices; (3) the use of national emergency boards; (4) the use of
adjustment boards; and (5) the provisions for enforcement.
As has been indicated above, the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
are all oriented toward the making and maintenance of the collectively
bargained employment contract. Thus, in placing the major emphasis
upon the regulation of the preliminaries to the negotiation of the collec-
tive agreement, and, once negotiated, the administration of the agreement
for its duration, the Railway Labor Act resembles the original Wagner
Act of 1935 much more closely than the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (the
NRLA). The prohibited unfair labor practices of management in the
Railway Labor Act, for example, are almost identical with the original
prohibited management practices in the Wagner Act of 1935 and are
retained in toto in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. In sharp contrast with
the Taft-Hartley law, the Railway Labor Act has no prohibited unfair
labor practices of unions.
The role or function of the NMB under the Railway Labor Act
stands out in even sharper contrast to the function of the NLRB under
the Taft-Hartley Act. The NMB, as its name implies, is concerned almost
exclusively with the mediation and conciliation of differences between
unions and management in the negotiation of employment contracts.
The NLRB, on the other hand, has no mediating or conciliating functions
at all. The NLRB is an enforcing agency— enforcing the provisions of
the NLRA on unfair labor practices against both management and
unions. These two boards, however, do have one function in common—
li
the holding of representation elections among employees for the purpose
of determining their collective bargaining preferences and certifying the
results of these elections to management.
There are similar provisions in both laws for the use of Presidential
Emergency Fact-Finding Boards. The Taft-Hartley law provides for their
use only when, in the President's judgment, the national health or safety
may be imperiled by a threatened strike. This implies that only a sparing
use of such boards is contemplated for nonrailroad and/or nonairline
employees, such as a nation-wide or industry-wide threatened strike in a
basic industry; i.e., coal or steel or atomic energy. Any threatened strike
or work stoppage on the railroads or airlines, however, may bring such
boards into use because of the threat of interruption to an essential trans-
portation service.
Nothing similar to the provision for adjustment boards to adjudicate
differences arising out of the day-to-day administration of existing em-
ployment contracts of the railroads and airlines is found in the Taft-
Hartley Act. In effect, the adjustment board provisions of the Railway
Labor Act require compulsory arbitration as a final step in the handling
of grievances arising out of existing contracts.
The two laws have similar provisions (since 1951) on union security;
i.e., both outlaw the closed shop and both permit the union shop and
check-off under certain conditions.
Finally, major differences between these two labor relations laws are
found in the area of enforcement and penalties. The NMB issues no
"cease and desist" orders, as does the NLRB. The use of the mandatory
and discretionary public injunction is not provided for in railway labor
relations, but both are available enforcement weapons under the NLRA.
Management violation of prohibited employment practices is made a
misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment under the Railway
Labor Act. No specific penalties are provided in the Act itself for failure
to abide by the decisions or awards of the adjustment boards or the NMB.
Numerous specific statutory penalties are set forth in the Taft-Hartley Act
for violation of its provisions, ranging all the way from private damage
suits to the use of public injunctions, denial of collective bargaining rights
protection, and contempt of court. The Railway Labor Act has nothing
similar to the prosecuting function of the General Counsel of the NLRB.
This brief review of some of the major areas of similarity and differ-
ences between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act may be helpful in
tracing and interpreting the labor relations experience in the air transport
industry during the past decade.
12
II. The Industrial Relations Experience Since 194 7
The first decade of industrial relations experience under the Railway
Labor Act may be described as the "formative" years. 22 The air transport
industry in the United States became of age during the period 1937-1947.
In becoming of age, it necessarily experienced some of the trials, pains,
and regulations that accompany industrial maturity. The regulations im-
posed during this period included rather close governmental controls over
rates and service, as well as over labor relations. Among its trials and
pains was the rather rapid development of trade unionism and collective
bargaining among its employees. Unlike the crafts or classes of employees
on the railroads who had negotiated and revised employment agreements
with their employers over a period of years, the air transport employees
and their employers had to build an entirely new agreement structure,
tailored to fit the particular characteristics of a new industry; and this
had to be accomplished in the main by inexperienced negotiators on both
sides. Thus, it was inevitable that a considerable amount of friction, dis-
agreement, and misunderstanding should arise in connection with the
whole process of collective bargaining. During these formative years
when employees and employers were trying to familiarize themselves
with the nature and content of collective bargaining, the NMB and the
legal machinery provided in the Railway Labor Act contributed immeas-
urably to the progress and understanding of collective negotiations by
pointing out the respective rights, duties, privileges, and prohibitions im-
posed on both parties by this legislation. The mediation and arbitration
See reference to an earlier monograph, footnote 1, p. 4.
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services of the NMB were used extensively during this period in the
negotiation of 168 new labor agreements covering various classes of air-
line personnel, with only seven work stoppages recorded. 25
Even though a considerable degree of maturity was achieved in this
industry by 1947, the real period of expansion and growth has taken
place in the past decade (1947-1957). Airline statistics reflecting this
growth are little short of spectacular. Total personnel employed by the
airlines increased from 61,711 in 1947 to 82,786 in 1950 and to 131,503
in 1956. 24 Revenue passenger-miles flown increased during this period
from 7,919,553 in 1947 to 27,623,229 in 1957. 2r' The number of aircraft
in service increased from 895 in 1947 to 1,565 in 1957. 20 The number
of air transport carriers increased during this same period from fewer
than thirty to over one hundred.
The growth of union organization and collective bargaining during this
past decade is indicated by the increase in the number of new labor
agreements on file with the NMB— from 168 in 1947 to 280 in 1957. 27
The rapidity of union organization of nonsupervisory air transport per-
sonnel during the early part of this period is indicated by the fact that
102 new labor agreements were filed with the NMB between 1947 and
1950. 28 Moreover, this growth of union organization has not been
limited to a few crafts or classes of air transport personnel during the
past decade, but has extended to practically all categories of employment
on the airlines. 29 The desire for employee representation in the airline
industry through collective bargaining has thus become so universal today
that it is the standard form or norm of employer-employee relationship
prevailing in this industry for most classes of employment.
The extent of union organization of the airlines varies considerably
among the various crafts or classes of personnel. The pilots and copilots
are by far the most completely organized group. The Air Line Pilots
Association International (ALPA) represents 90 to 95 per cent of the
employees in this category. 30 The mechanics are the next most highly
organized group and are represented principally by the International
Association of Machinists (IAM). 31 In 1958 this union claimed to repre-
sent some 80 to 85 per cent of the 33,000 mechanics employed by the
23
Ibid., pp. 18-20.
24 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1957, pp. 38-39.
' Ibid.
20
Ibid.
27 Twenty-third Annual Report of the NMB, 1957, p. 66.
28 See Appendix A.
2fl See Appendix C.
80
In May 1958 ALPA claimed to have 13,266 active dues-paying members out
of some 14,000 pilots and copilots on the airlines. They were organized through
some 146 local unions. (Data obtained from ALPA.)
" Sec Appendix C.
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airlines,32 which is about a 100 per cent increase in union membership
in this category since 1947. In addition to the mechanics, IAM has
organized and represents a large portion of the ramp and stores workers,
dining service employees, and guards employed by the major airlines.
The stewards, stewardesses, and pursers are represented mainly by the
Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association International (ALSSA).
This union represented about 40 per cent of these employees in 1948 and
50 per cent in 1956. 33 Union membership in this group has increased
approximately 100 per cent since 1947. The dispatchers and communica-
tions employees are about 60 to 65 per cent organized and are represented
mainly by the Air Line Dispatchers Association (ALDA) and the Air
Line Communications Employees Association (ALCEA). The flight
engineers are some 70 to 75 per cent organized and are represented by
the Flight Engineers' International Association (FEIA). 34 The smallest
percentage of organization of any group in the airline industry is in the
white-collar office and clerical personnel. This group comprises by far
the largest category of airline employees. 35 The Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes
(BRC) and the Air Line Agents Association International (ALAA)
appear to have made the most progress in organizing the white-collar
workers, but they still remain the largest unorganized group in the airline
industry. In 1958, probably not more than 10 to 15 per cent of the
white-collar office and clerical employees were represented through col-
lective bargaining.
32 Estimate obtained from IAM.
33 In 1958 this union claimed 4,900 dues-paying members out of some 9,000
employees in this category. (Information obtained from the union.)
34 In 1956 this union claimed a membership of 2,300 employees out of a total
of 3,400 in this craft. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory
of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1957, p. 33.
35 In 1956 there were some 50,000 employees in this category. See Appendix B.
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III. The Work of the National Mediation Board
The experience of the NMB with industrial relations problems of the
airlines is largely reflected in the industrial relations statistics summarized
in Appendix A. During the past decade an increasingly large proportion
of the NMB's time has been devoted to the industrial relations problems
of this industry. With less than 6 per cent of the employees covered by
the Railway Labor Act, industrial relations problems of the airlines have
consumed from 25 to 30 per cent of the NMB's time in recent years. 36
This compares with 10 to 15 per cent of its time devoted to airline cases
prior to 1947.
The large number of representation cases handled by the NMB in the
early part of this period (1947-1950) was to a great extent the result of
the active organizing campaigns being carried on among various classes
of airline personnel. The NMB's duty here was to conduct representation
elections to determine employee preference of collective bargaining repre-
sentatives and to certify the results of these elections to employers. The
318 representation cases handled by the NMB during this decade com-
pare with only ninety-nine cases handled in the preceding ten years
(1937-1947). One hundred and forty-one of these representation cases,
or nearly one-half of the total of 318, were disposed of by the NMB in
the period 1947-1950. By 1950, organization for purposes of collective
bargaining among the major classes of airline personnel had lost much
of its initial momentum and growth, although organization was far from
i omplete in numerous categories, notably the white-collar personnel. The
Annual reports of the NMB, 1947-1957.
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rise in the number of representation cases handled by the NMB in recent
years (1950-1957) has partially been due to the increase in jurisdictional
disputes between unions seeking to win representation rights among
already organized employees. The merger of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in
1955 has had little effect on this competition between unions for repre-
sentation rights among already organized workers because most of this
jurisdictional competition has been between former AFL craft unions.
In the past year (1958) these jurisdictional disputes have intensified in
several areas, notably the conflict between FEIA and ALPA.
The tremendous increase in the number of mediation cases handled
by the NMB during the past ten years deserves special mention. The
NMB's mediation services were utilized in disposing of 680 cases. 37 This
compares with 109 mediation cases disposed of by the NMB in the pre-
ceding ten years (1937-1947). What accounted for this six-fold increase
in the mediation activity of the NMB? The Railway Labor Act provides
for the use of the mediation services of the NMB when the parties in-
volved are unable to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of
employment in negotiating new agreements. Disputes and grievances
arising out of the interpretation and day-to-day administration of existing
agreements are to be settled by final recourse to adjustment boards,
according to the Railway Labor Act. But increasingly, during recent
years, union organizations have set strike dates in an effort to force the
prompt disposition of time claims and grievances arising under existing
contracts, thus necessitating the use of the mediation services of the NMB.
The NMB has vigorously condemned this indiscriminate use of the strike
threat by airline unions in their effort to force more prompt settlement
of their grievances. But the mediation case load of the NMB has con-
tinued to grow until it has become by far the heaviest and most time-
consuming activity of all the NMB's functions; and this has come about
largely as a result of the union practice mentioned above.
If the NMB is unable to effect an amicable settlement of a dispute by
mediation, it is then required by the Railway Labor Act to endeavor to
induce the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. It should be
emphasized that the Act does not compel the parties to accept arbitration,
but the NMB considers its duty to try to get the parties to accept arbitra-
tion, when mediation fails to resolve the controversy, as important as its
mediation efforts themselves. That arbitration, rather than resort to a
test of economic strength through strike action, has been utilized by
unions and management rather freely during the past decade is attested
to by the fact that arbitration was used to dispose of sixty-two disputes
during this period. 38 As might be expected, the predominate issues sub-
See Appendix A.
See Appendix A.
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mitted for arbitration involved changes in rates of pay and/or working
rules. The airline unions most frequently using arbitration during this
period were IAM and ALPA, but practically every union of the airlines
had one or more arbitration cases during the past ten years, and most of
them had six or more.
The emergency provisions of the Railway Labor Act were invoked ten
times in the last ten years. 39 These provisions, it will be recalled, require
the NMB to notify the President of the failure of mediation and arbitra-
tion efforts of the NMB to solve the dispute and the resulting imminence
of a work stoppage by the craft or class of employees involved. The
President then appoints a fact-finding board to investigate the controversy
and report its findings and recommendations for settlement to the Presi-
dent. During this period, work stoppages are prohibited. At the end of
the period a legal strike or work stoppage may be instituted. The intent
of the law is to bring the full force of public opinion to bear in getting
the parties involved to agree to a peaceful settlement of their dispute.
Strikes and work stoppages do occur, however, in the airline industry
despite these provisions. In the past ten years, thirty-five strikes have
occurred (see Appendix A). This compares with five work stoppages in
the preceding ten years (1937-1947). Although most of these work stop-
pages on individual airlines were of short duration (less than a week) , and
involved a small number of workers (one to fifty), a few were more
serious in terms of interruption of essential air transportation service. The
most serious strikes were those involving ALPA, for the obvious reason
that when the pilots strike, airplanes owned by that carrier are grounded
and transportation service is interrupted. The longest strikes were those
involving the pilots on the National Airlines in 1948 (ten months), on
American Airlines in 1956 (fifty-three days), on American Airlines in
1955 (twenty-five days), on Trans World Airlines in 1947 (twenty-one
days), and on the U. S. Overseas Airlines in 1948 (eighteen days). 40
See Appendix A.
Annual reports of the NMB, 1947-1957.
IV. Major Industrial Relations Issues and Problems
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Jurisdictional problems of the airline unions have been complicated
and multiplied by the Railway Labor Act provisions calling for employee
representation by craft or class for purposes of collective bargaining. The
NMB in discharging its responsibility for designating the appropriate class
or craft for employee collective bargaining has in general followed the
policy of accepting the voluntary association, self-organization, and recog-
nition of employee groups on the airlines. Compared with the railroad
industry, therefore, the NMB has had to make relatively few formal
determinations of appropriate classes or crafts among airline employees.
The pilots, airline dispatchers, and stewardesses all have secured represen-
tation rights through voluntary association and recognition, with no
formal determinations of their scope by the NMB. In 1945, the present
craft or class of airline mechanics was found to exist by voluntary associa-
tion and recognition on a great many airlines. The craft or class of
professional flight engineers came into being with the four-motored trans-
port planes in 1947-48 and was recognized by the NMB without a formal
determination. In 1947 the navigators and meteorologists were recognized
by the NMB by formal determination as separate crafts or classes for
collective bargaining purposes.
Organization of other classes of airline personnel since 1947 has posed
more serious problems for the NMB. Increasingly in recent years the
NMB has been called upon to make formal determinations of the appro-
priate class or craft for representation purposes of stockroom and store-
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room employees, cargo and ramp service employees, clerical and office
employees, and various smaller divisions of these employee groups. For
example, should the airline agents be accorded separate employee repre-
sentation status or be included in the office, fleet, and passenger service
employee groups? Three unions, besides ALAA, have been competing
for representation rights among these employees— IAM, Transport Work-
ers Union of America (TWU), and BRC. In settling these representation
disputes, the NMB has generally decided each case on its own merits, but
has apparently given major weight to the employees' own preference, or
to whichever union organized the group in the first place. At present,
IAM has made more progress in winning representation rights among
these nonoperating airline personnel than the other unions. (See Ap-
pendix C.)
Currently, the most serious jurisdictional conflict between unions of
the airlines involves FEIA and ALPA. Although flight engineers were
first introduced into the airline industry in 1937 by Pan American World
Airways, they were little more than flying mechanics recruited from
the mechanical maintenance forces until 1946-47. With the advent of the
four-motored Constellations and the DC-6 type airplanes in 1946-47, the
instrument panels formerly observed and operated by the first pilot and
copilot became more and more complicated, resulting in the need for a
third man in the cockpit. This third man was designated as a flight
engineer and his job was to relieve the pilot and copilot of a part of the
duties formerly performed by them. Subsequently, the Civil Aeronautics
Board issued a ruling requiring the employment of a flight engineer on
all four-engine aircraft having a gross weight of more than 80,000 pounds.
FEIA first made its appearance in 1948, and for the next nine years
FEIA and ALPA seem to have lived together fairly harmoniously. But
the planned introduction of the new jet-powered airplanes into regular
passenger service in late 1958 has once again raised the specter of tech-
nological unemployment among the pilots. Consequently, collective bar-
gaining in 1957-58 between the pilots and engineers and the major air
carriers has been badly hampered by the issue of which union should
control the job of the third man in the new jet airplanes. 41 Although
three major airlines (Pan American World Airways, American Airlines,
and Trans World Airlines) signed new contracts in late 1957 and early
1958 with FEIA awarding this third man job to the flight engineers, the
issue is far from settled as of this writing. The pilots are threatening to
refuse to fly the new jet airliners of any airline unless the third cockpit
" The four months' strike of the airline pilots against Western Airlines
(February 21 to June 20, 1958) was over this issue. In addition, strike threats by
ALPA resulting from the breakdown of collective bargaining negotiations over this
issue are hanging over four other major airlines at the present writing.
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man is a qualified pilot. The pilots have so far refused to negotiate new
contracts with any airline unless this job is assigned to their craft.
ALPA contends that the new jets must have three pilots for safety's
sake. But the real fear of the pilots is that the bigger, faster jets will
mean smaller airline fleets and thus fewer pilot jobs unless they win the
third-man spot. The pilots expressed somewhat the same fear when the
four-motor airplanes were first introduced in 1946-47. The history of air
travel, however, casts doubt on the validity of this fear. The introduction
of new flight equipment so far has led to increased airline traffic, larger
airline fleets, and more personnel and employment. A merger of ALPA
and FEIA might provide some solution to this jurisdictional conflict, but
this does not seem likely to result at the present time, despite the fact
that they are both affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
The NMB's jurisdictional problems, however, have not been limited
to disputes over the designation of appropriate classes or crafts for em-
ployee representation purposes. The NMB has also been faced with the
problem of defining its jurisdiction over U. S. employees of foreign airlines
and over foreign employees of U. S. airlines. In addition, the authority of
the NMB to determine who are employees or "subordinate officials"
within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act has been challenged. The
NMB has ruled that its jurisdiction over employees is limited to the con-
tinental boundaries of the United States and its territories under the Rail-
way Labor Act. It has, therefore, dismissed petitions by ALPA and other
union groups for recognition as collective bargaining representatives of
employees of foreign airlines and has also denied employees of U. S. air-
lines based abroad the right to vote in representation elections. The NMB
has further insisted that its jurisdiction covers employees of U. S. airline
companies, regardless of whether said employees are engaged in airline
work. 42
42 This issue arose in 1957 in connection with a dispute between the Pan
American World Airways and IAM involving the employees of the company at the
Guided Missiles Range Base, Cocoa, Florida. The NMB concluded that these
employees were subject to its jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act. The
NMB said, "Title II of the Railway Labor Act, which related to airlines, is
written in simple unambiguous language : 'All of the provisions of Title I of this
Act are extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, and every pilot or other person who performs any
work as an employee.' The test is simple: Is the employer a common carrier by
air engaged in interstate commerce? Does the individual perform any work as an
employee? If both answers are in the affirmative, the Board's jurisdiction is clear.
It is admitted by the parties that Pan American is a carrier within the definition of
Title II of the Railway Labor Act. It is further undisputed that the employees
involved herein are performing, in general, plant maintenance work of the kind
and character that is performed by similar employees for the same company at its
base where its planes are maintained." (Annual Report of the NMB, 1957, p. 9.)
Subsequently, the U. S. District Court upheld the NMB's jurisdiction over these
employees. (Ibid., p. 9.)
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The NMB has also ruled that it does have power to determine who are
employees or "subordinate officials" under the Railway Labor Act, and
this authority has been upheld by the courts. 4 "' The determination of just
where this jurisdictional line is to be drawn between employees and
"subordinate officials" covered by the Railway Labor Act and manage-
ment personnel who are not within the NMB's jurisdiction has not been
easy or simple. 44 No one knows precisely where "management" ends and
"employees" begins. Consequently, there is no definitive administrative
standard that can be applied in separating "management" or "employer"
from "labor" or "employees" for purposes of labor-management relations.
In assuming complete responsibility for this determination, therefore, the
NMB has fallen back upon the old principle of deciding each case on its
merits, and has avoided the problem of attempting to set standards of
more or less universal applicability.
ADJUSTMENT BOARD PROBLEMS
It will be remembered that under Title II of the Railway Labor Act,
adjustment boards are provided for the settlement of grievances arising
out of the interpretation or administration of existing employment con-
tracts. A National Air Transport Board is to be established for the
disposition of these grievances when and if the NMB decides it is neces-
sary. Up to the present no such board has been established. Instead,
system boards of adjustment have handled these grievances. Being bi-
partisan, these boards frequently become deadlocked. The NMB's media-
tion services are thus frequently called upon to break the deadlock,
especially when the bipartisan members cannot agree upon a neutral
referee. The use of neutral referees to settle grievances unresolved by
these bipartisan adjustment boards has increased tremendously in the past
ten years. Since 1950, the NMB has been called upon to appoint from
twenty to thirty-five neutral referees per year to break system adjustment
board deadlocks. In addition, special adjustment boards have been
resorted to occasionally to dispose of some of the more difficult cases. But
the most serious problem in this area (discussed briefly earlier) has been
the practice of unions in setting strike dates to speed up the disposition
of grievances arising under existing contracts. This problem seems to be
growing in seriousness in recent years.
13 This authority was challenged by the Northwest Airlines in 1953, and in-
volved a group of employees known as coordinators, technicians, instructors, and
work planners. (Annual Report of the NMB, 1953, p. 8.)
44 For example, the NMB in 1953 was asked to accept ALPA as the collective
bargaining representative for a group of employees known as flight instructors
employed by Pan American World Airways. The company contended that these
people were not employees or "subordinate officials" but were part of manage-
ment. The NMB ruled in favor of the company. (Annual Report of the NMB,
1953, p. 9.)
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VTHE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAIN
Collective bargaining on the airlines is carried on almost exclusively
by individual craft unions with individual companies. The one exception
is IAM. In 1954, for the first time, the machinists succeeded in getting
six of the largest air carriers to negotiate a new contract jointly. Again in
1955 the machinists persuaded six companies to engage in joint contract
negotiation. In the past two years the machinists have continued to press
for multi-employer bargaining in negotiating new contracts, but with
rather limited success. Since 1946, the employers have generally opposed
the principle of multi-employer bargaining with separate craft unions,
and, with the exception of the machinists, the various craft unions have
shown little or no interest in this form of bargaining. Futhermore, neither
the employers nor the various craft unions have evinced any particular
interest in multi-union bargaining. Individual union and company bar-
gaining thus seems to be the preferred form of bargaining on the airlines
by both sides.
The content of the collective bargain on the airlines has undergone
major changes during the past ten years, as might be expected. Many of
these changes have been adopted only after lengthy negotiations and exten-
sive use of all the machinery provided for in the Railway Labor Act. First
of all, the duration of the agreement itself has been a source of an increas-
ing number of disputes of the airlines. The prevailing, in fact almost
universal, practice of airline unions is to make agreements for a period
of one year, in contrast to the usual method on rail carriers of making
agreements of indefinite duration, subject to reopening on thirty days'
notice by either party. This practice of negotiating one-year contracts
with the airlines not only provides a short period of wage rate and rule
stability and industrial peace, but it also results in the airline companies'
receiving yearly demands for wage and rule changes. This typically has
given rise to general contract revision disputes requiring the mediation
services of the NMB. These short contract periods, therefore, have been
responsible for a much larger number of disputes on the airlines than
would occur if the contracts were of longer duration. Some slight tend-
ency to increase the duration of the agreement has been noticeable in the
past two years for a few crafts and on a few air carriers. But there seems
to be no general movement on the airlines in this direction.
The growth of union-management negotiated health and welfare and
other "fringe" employment provisions has been one of the more spectac-
ular developments in industrial relations for nonairline employees since
1947. The airline unions have not been able to match this growth in their
industry. This lag becomes all the more serious for the airline employee
when it is remembered that these employees have not been completely
covered by the major public programs in the field of unemployment, old
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age, and disability protection. The railroad industry has its own public
benefit program under the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act, but airline workers are not included under
these laws and the coverage in the state and federal social security pro-
grams has been spotty and not uniform. Therefore, the airline unions
have had to attempt to provide additional protection in these areas out
of their own resources or negotiate this protection in collective bargaining
contracts with the employers.
The negotiation of death, disability, old age retirement, and other
welfare benefits has been progressing on the airlines during the past
decade, but it has been slow and it has not by any means reached the
levels or proportions achieved by nonairline employees. The limited pro-
tection in public programs for airline employees against the risk of
unemployment, for example, has made the negotiation of severance pay
a major goal of the airline unions since 1947. Severance pay provisions
have thus become rather typical in airline agreements for all craft or
classes of employment at the present time.
Contract provisions in the areas of sick leave, accidents, vacation, and
death benefits, all on a noncontributory (employee) basis, have been
developed and expanded in the past ten years. ALPA, for example, has
improved the benefits in these areas very materially in recent years. Paid
vacation allowances have increased from twelve days per year to twenty-
four days per year on most airlines. Death benefits and permanent and
total disability benefit amounts have been substantially increased, as have
allowances for moving expenses, meals, and lodging. Old age retirement
benefits, however, are still nonexistent on most airlines for most groups of
employees. The pilots negotiated their first agreement calling for old
age retirement benefits for these employees with Pan American World
Airways in 1955. Since then these benefits have been negotiated with
several other airlines, but they remain exceptions rather than universal
contract provisions, even for the pilots. For nonoperating personnel,
fringe benefits are largely limited to paid vacations and holidays, sick
leave, and company furnished uniforms for such categories as armed
guards. Provision for hospitalization and medical care is thus almost
completely nonexistent in airline contracts.
Job security provisions have become increasingly important items in
contract negotiations with practically all categories of airline personnel
in recent years, due partly to the rapidity of technological changes in this
industry. This has been especially important for the operating personnel.
Therefore, all contracts today have provisions dealing with seniority—
usually calling for company-wide seniority for the operating personnel and
departmental- or job classification-wide seniority for nonoperating person-
nel. Contract provisions calling for annual improvement (productivity)
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increases, cost of living escalator clauses, etc., found rather generally in
union-management contracts covering broad areas of employment in
nonairline industries, are totally absent on the airlines.
Since 1951, an amendment to the Railway Labor Act has made it
legally possible for railroad and airline unions to negotiate for the union
shop and the check-off. Up until now (1958), airline unions have made
considerable progress in incorporating these provisions in their employ-
ment contracts. No use, however, has been made by ALPA of the union
shop or other union security provisions. The first union shop clause
incorporated into an agreement on the airlines was negotiated in 1951
by the Transport Workers Union with American Airlines and covered
the mechanics, fleet, and ground service employees. The NMB estimated
that by 1953, 45 per cent of the estimated total of 85,000 airline employees
were covered by union shop agreements45 and in 1955, 50 per cent of
the 104,000 employees were covered. 46 In general, the unions representing
the nonoperating personnel of the airlines have been more interested, and
more successful, in negotiating union shop provisions than the unions
representing the operating personnel. ALSSA, for example, negotiated
its first union shop agreement in 1956 with the Alaskan, Trans Pacific,
Hawaiian, and Carribean Airlines. In 1957 it negotiated a union shop
with Trans World Airlines. Their union shop coverage is thus very small.
In 1956 the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the union
shop amendment to the Railway Labor Act in meeting a challenge of
conflict with a state right-to-work law. 47
PARTICULAR UNION PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
In addition to the many general industrial relations issues and prob-
lems of the airline unions during the past ten years which have been
discussed above, most groups of airline personnel have had their particular
problems in negotiating the terms and conditions of employment with
their employers. The rapidity of technological change on the airlines has
been responsible for many of these particular problems, especially those
concerning operating personnel. The pilots have undoubtedly been faced
with the most serious problems in adjusting to rapid technological changes.
Annual disputes over the appropriate method of calculating pilots' pay
have plagued industrial relations between ALPA and employers in the
past ten years. A gross airplane weight increment, "pegged speed," an
international flight pay differential, minimum guaranteed monthly pay,
operational duty time, "dead-head" pay, and a modified "portal-to-
portal" pay provision have all been added to an already extremely com-
45 Annual Report of the NMB, 1953, p. 10.
46 Annual Report of the NMB, 1954, p. 9.
47 351 U. S. 225 (1956), Railway Employees Dept. v. Robert L. Hanson et al.
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plicated formula for pilot compensation in the past ten years. 4H As
airplanes have become larger, faster, and more complicated, the fear of
the pilots of technological unemployment has progressively increased, and
their efforts to adjust to these technological changes have resulted in the
most prolonged negotiations and serious disputes experienced by the air-
lines since 1947. The current fears of the pilots of the impact of the new
jet airplanes upon employment, earnings, etc., is the major obstacle to the
early completion of 1958 contract negotiations between ALPA and the
various air carriers.
ALSSA has also had its own particular problems in recent years. New
collective bargaining issues for this union have included negotiation of
additional pay for liquor and/or food service in flight, elimination of
early compulsory retirement for stewardesses, softening of rigid carrier
rules against marriage, dealing with the problem of race displacement on
certain carriers, such as Northwest Airlines, on-duty time limitations, etc.
The addition of death and disability benefits, paid for by the employers,
has been one of the major accomplishments of this union in recent con-
tract negotiations.
Besides the almost continuous problem of jurisdiction, the most serious
problem faced by IAM in recent years has been the contracting-out of
maintenance work by the airlines. Disputes over this issue have fre-
quently gone to arbitration, and even to emergency boards and strike
action in other instances, before final settlement has been reached. The
machinists have partially resolved this threat to their job security by or-
ganizing the mechanics employed by the firms to whom the work was
contracted. 49 This issue continues to hamper peaceful industrial relations
between the machinists, clerks, and certain communications employees
and their employers.
48 As early as 1951, for example, the pay of pilots was based upon six different
factors: (1) base pay; (2) length of service; (3) hourly rate; (4) speed of the
aircraft; (5) mileage flown; (6) gross weight of the aircraft.
49 IAM, for example, lists 2,500 employees working for airline service com-
panies, such as the Aircraft Engineering and Maintenance Company, as members
of IAM. (Letter from IAM.)
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V. Evaluation of Airline Industrial Relations Experience
An over-all evaluation of airline industrial relations experience is diffi-
cult— if for no other reason than that there are no well defined or ac-
cepted standards for judgment. To appraise this experience, for example,
solely on the basis of how many strikes or work stoppages, if any, occurred
during this period would be to use a standard that is subject to obvious
limitations and qualifications. The extent to which industrial peace has
been maintained or improved is certainly one factor to be considered in
any over-all appraisal, 50 but there are many others equally or more impor-
tant. How well has the Railway Labor Act functioned, over all, in
promoting good industrial relations for the airlines? What strengths and
weaknesses have become evident in the present regulation of airline
industrial relations? Should new legislation be developed for the air
transport industry? The answers to such questions as these would appear
to be the most useful in appraising the experience of the past decade.
There seems to be little disagreement with the conclusion that the pro-
visions of the Railway Labor Act rendered a valuable service in the
development of collective bargaining and modern industrial relations for
the airlines during the period 1937-1947. The Act provided a legal frame-
work for the orderly development of collective bargaining and employee
representation. The mediating and conciliating facilities and experience
of the NMB undoubtedly contributed immeasurably to the peaceful settle-
ment of many airline labor disputes. Other provisions of the law, such as
50
Thirty-five strikes in the past ten years is certainly no evidence of excellence
in good industrial relations on the airlines.
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the use of adjustment boards and voluntary arbitration, undoubtedly
helped to settle many others. But in recent years, serious questions have
been raised as to the continued efficacy and appropriateness of the provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act in promoting good industrial relations for
the airlines. 51 These criticisms have been concentrated mainly on the
Act's provisions dealing with coverage, representation, emergency boards,
and content of the collective agreement.
If the Railway Labor Act is retained as the legal framework for indus-
trial relations regulation of the airlines, several changes in this statute
would appear to be desirable. First of all, the Act's ambiguity and un-
certainty with reference to its coverage should be clarified. The definition
of "employee or subordinate official" leaves too much vagueness and too
much latitude for administrative interpretation in establishing the Act's
coverage for collective bargaining purposes, and is not, therefore, con-
ducive to good industrial relations. The NMB's assumption of final
authority to make this determination is further questionable, insofar as
the language of the Act itself is concerned. A more specific definition of
the terms "employee or subordinate official," such as is found in the Taft-
Hartley law, would greatly clarify and improve the Act's provisions with
reference to coverage. Also, a specific allocation of authority to the NMB
or the Civil Aeronautics Board to make final determinations in disputes
over this coverage would be a real improvement in the present statute.
Additional amendments to the law would be helpful in defining the
coverage for collective bargaining purposes of personnel employed by
corporations owned or controlled by air carriers and engaged in nonairline
transportation work, as well as in clarifying the question of the Act's
application to domestic employees of foreign airlines and American and
foreign employees of domestic airlines who are stationed abroad. Such
changes as these would eliminate many disputes over the Act's jurisdic-
tional authority in the field of employee coverage.
In the area of employee representation, the present law is too
arbitrary, narrow, and rigid in its application to the air transport industry.
In providing that the majority of the employees in any craft or class shall
have exclusive bargaining rights for representation purposes, the law
predetermined the structural form of union organization in this industry.
In thus fastening the narrow, horizontal, craft form of union organization
on the airline industry, before it was organized, the wishes of employers
and employees were and are ignored, and they are given no choice or
latitude in developing collective bargaining along industrial union lines.
51 For example, see articles by Malcolm Maclntyre, "The Railway Labor Act—
A Misfit for the Airlines," Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Summer 1952, pp.
274-289, and J. B. Frankel, "Airline Labor Policy, the Stepchild of the Railway
Labor Act," Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Autumn 1951, pp. 461-486.
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The fact that this type of union organization was developed by choice on
the railroads, and has worked very well there, provides very little guaran-
tee that it is equally desirable or equally satisfactory as the best form of
union organization on the airlines. It is in sharp contrast with the provi-
sions of the Taft-Hartley law which permits almost unlimited employee
choice in selecting the form of union organization desired. At the very
least, the Act should be amended to permit some employee choice of the
type of union organization best suited to the needs of this new industry.
It is very doubtful that the narrow craft form of organization would have
been universally chosen by airline employees if they had had an opportu-
nity to express a choice in this matter. Outside of the strategically-located
craft of pilots, there is little doubt that the bargaining strength of most
groups of craft organized employees on the airlines would be increased
tremendously by organization along industrial lines.
The advantages of industrial unionism, moreover, are not limited to
the nonpilot personnel of the airlines. Management might also prefer this
form of bargaining. Instead of having to bargain separately with as many
as thirteen or more unions, bargaining with one or two unions would
appear to be infinitely more preferable because it would be less time con-
suming and less costly. Finally, the elimination of many jurisdictional
conflicts over representation rights under narrow craft unionism would
appear to add additional strength to the argument that the Act should
be amended to permit more latitude in this area.
There seems to be little disagreement with the judgment that the
mediating, conciliating, and arbitrating machinery of the Act has unduly
prolonged the collective bargaining process on the airlines. All too
frequently, serious bargaining is delayed until all the machinery provided
in the Act has been exhausted. This typically has meant long drawn-out
negotiations and postponement of final settlement of disputes. The lapse
of as much as a year or more from the time of starting collective bargain-
ing until the final negotiation of new contract terms does not promote
good industrial relations. Some changes in the law are needed to speed up
this process.
The most ineffective machinery provided in the law for the settlement
of industrial disputes on the airlines is the use of emergency fact-finding
boards. Not only have the recommendations of these boards typically not
been acceptable to the parties involved, and thus have not provided a
basis for final settlement in most instances, but the use of these boards
has added to the delay in reaching a final settlement. The reliance upon
the pressure of public opinion to force either the acceptance of the emer-
gency board recommendations or an early agreement between the parties
has simply not worked in too many cases. The reason for this failure is
found in the public indifference to most airline disputes. The public does
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not get seriously aroused or concerned about a strike threat among airline
personnel which does not involve much, or any, threat of serious public
inconvenience. A strike of the pilots, only, offers much risk to the
interruption of an essential transportation service, and even here a strike
on one airline alone does not involve too much public inconvenience. If
the use of emergency fact-finding boards has fallen into considerable dis-
repute in recent years as a final step in the procedure for maintaining
industrial peace on the airlines (and the railroads), what are the alterna-
tives? Is any other legal machinery preferable? Compulsory arbitration
with compulsory award is obviously not the answer. Compulsory arbitra-
tion with compulsory award is repugnant to, and incompatible with, a
free society. Instead of new regulatory legislation, therefore, the answer
to this problem apparently must be sought in the development of more
mature collective bargaining relationships and the acceptance of more
responsibility for finding peaceful solutions to their industrial disputes on
the part of both parties to these disputes. At this point, the role of
government and law seems to have exhausted its potential for promoting
industrial peace in a free society, and therefore to secure this social
objective more reliance must be placed upon the human factors of greater
wisdom, understanding, and desire.
A few final general observations and appraisals may be offered in con-
clusion. Since there appears to be no overwhelming or even serious
discontent with the Act's regulation of industrial relations by the em-
ployers and employees involved, this writer does not have the temerity to
suggest that airline industrial relations should be removed from the Act's
control. This does not mean, however, that certain features of the present
regulations could not be improved, as have been discussed above, or that
new additions to the present regulations would not be helpful in promot-
ing better industrial relations for the airlines. There is no valid reason,
for example, why certain provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, such as
union unfair labor practices, union decertification, individual union mem-
ber protections, etc., should not be added to the present law of airline
industrial relations. The present Act is much more comparable to the
original Wagner Act in its scope and objectives than to the Taft-Hartley
law of 1947. The Railway Labor Act, therefore, may have been much
more appropriate as a legal framework for the development of collective
bargaining in the first decade of industrial relations experience of the air-
lines than it is today. Since organization and industrial relations have
come of age, with relatively equal bargaining strength between the parties
involved, a law designed to protect the weaker party against an employer-
bargaining-strength advantage seems to be rather unrealistic and unfair.
But even within the existing legal framework, the writer believes certain
practices could be changed for the better in airline industrial relations.
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More use should be made of voluntary arbitration, particularly in the
negotiation of new contracts. This would greatly reduce the mediation
load of the NMB and shorten the negotiation time. A wider use of
multi-employer bargaining would appear to offer many advantages,
especially for employers, over individual company bargaining. Contracts
should be negotiated for longer terms, possibly of indefinite length, as on
the railroads, rather than for the duration of one year. This change
would unquestionably reduce the number of annual disputes over new
contract terms.
The air transport industry is still a relatively new and certainly a
rapidly growing industry. In such a dynamic situation, therefore, a set of
regulatory rules for industrial relations which may be fairly satisfactory
today may be obsolete tomorrow. Both society and the industry must
remain sufficiently flexible to adjust to changing conditions with a mini-
mum of social cost and friction.
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Appendix A
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS STATISTICS, 1 947-1 957 1
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total
Number of new
labor agreements 29 23 33 17 3 10 5 11 5 2 3 141
Number of represen-
tation cases 42 46 32 21 27 30 24 24 18 19 35 318
Number of media-
tion cases 36 50 63 49 66 72 72 79 71 64 58 680
Number of arbitra-
tion cases 9 9 6 10 6 3 3 6 4 5 1 62
Number of emer-
gency cases 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 10
Number of
strikes 1 2 1 1 4 4 6 5 3 5 3 35
Data given on fiscal year basis. Source: Annual Reports of the National Mediation Board, 1947-1957.
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Appendix B
TOTAL PERSONNEL, PAYROLL, AND AVERAGE SALARY— U. S. AIRLINES, 1956 1
Personnel
Annual
Payroll
Average
Annual
Salary
Total
Pilots and copilots
Other flight personnel
Stewards, stewardesses, pursers
Dispatchers, communication operators, and meteorologists
Mechanics
Other hangar and field personnel
Other employees
All others
131,503 $706,062,807 $ 5,369.18
11,385 1 36,079,037 11,951.96
3,384 30,050,223 8,880.09
8,086 27,681,380 3,418.93
3,605 18,428,927 5,111.34
30,962 165,096,962 5,332.24
20,657 93,648,844 4,533.41
49,335 217,120,021 4,400.89
4,076 17,957,413 4,405.10
Data based upon the domestic and international carriers' figures for 1956.
tion, Statistical Handbook of Civil Aviation, 1957, pp. 76 and 92.
See Ci Aeronautics Administra-
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